• About Us
  • Our Practice Areas
    • Banking & Financial Services
    • Competition & Antitrust
    • Digital & Tech
    • EU & International
    • Food & Drink
    • Green Transition
    • Healthcare, Life Sciences & Wellbeing
    • Trade & Investment (including EU-UK)
    • Transport, Travel & Logistics
  • Our Team
    • FIPRA International
    • Special Advisors
  • FIPRA Network
  • Latest News
  • Events
  • Careers
Skip to content

FIPRA

Search for:
FIPRA Network

Italy general election 2022

By Marco Sonsini
Monday, 26 September 2022
Italy general election 2022

The results of Italy’s general elections were no surprise. As polls had predicted throughout the electoral campaign, the centre-right coalition won approximately 44% of the national vote, with an 18% lead on the centre-left, and will command a solid majority in the next Parliament, thanks to an electoral system that awards one-third of the seats in both Houses through first-past-the-post races. Looking at the map, the centre-right is the dominant political force throughout the country, from North to South, and has made significant inroads even in the traditional strongholds of the Left, once known as the “Red Regions” of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. 

Within the coalition, the right-wing Brothers of Italy (a member of the ECR group in the European Parliament) established itself as Italy’s largest party with approximately 26% of the vote: as many have observed, a party with roots in neo-fascism is the country’s leading political actor for the first time since 1945, and its leader, Giorgia Meloni (45), is most likely to be appointed as the first woman Prime Minister in the weeks to come. It would be deceitful, however, to explain this success as the sign of a radicalisation of the Italian electorate: it is much more plausible that large pockets of voters who have experienced severe economic hardship over the last decade and voted for self-proclaimed Eurosceptic parties in the previous general election of 2018 (the Five Star Movement on the left, Lega on the right) shifted to Brothers of Italy when those two parties joined the national unity majority in support of Mario Draghi in 2021.

This explains very well the extremely disappointing performances of Lega (around 9%, vs. 18% in 2018) and the Five Star Movement (around 15%, vs. 32% in 2018), as well as the very poor turnout, hitting a record low of 63% (down from 73% in 2018, 75% in 2013 and 80% in 2008). In other words, Meloni, the only political leader who opposed Draghi, was the only choice left for disaffected voters once all the others pledged allegiance to a mainstream economic policy agenda.

While the top priority of a centre-right Cabinet chaired by Meloni will be to support small and medium enterprises, as well as households, who are suffering from an increase in energy bills, the coalition will also put in effort to reduce the tax burden, lower the pension age and block or delay liberalisations of services that are harmful to their key constituencies.

This is likely to lead the next Cabinet to rediscuss some of the priorities set by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, particularly concerning tax reform and competition policies. Contrast to illegal immigration will be another topic on which Meloni’s Cabinet will depart from the permissive approach of the outgoing one, possibly by restoring the more restrictive legislation passed by Lega’s leader Salvini when he was Minister of the Interior in 2018-19, and later repealed. All this will call into question Italy’s relations with the EU partners and the European Commission, possibly generating conflicts on matters related to the management of Italy’s public finances, economic reforms, and migration policy. 

The centre-left coalition, with the Democratic Party (PD) as its leading political force, experienced the second consecutive defeat after the one in 2018; PD leader Enrico Letta announced that he will not run for party leader again when the next party conference comes. Letta focused his campaign on stressing the need for all progressives to unite in support of the centre-left coalition, to prevent the threat of a far-right Government which – so PD’s propaganda went – would put not only Italy’s loyalty to NATO but even Italy’s democratic regime under threat.

Polls have suggested quite consistently throughout this campaign that this message was not effective, at least outside a narrow echo chamber of educated urban voters. This may be due to various reasons, including the fact that the Italian electorate is probably much more worried about the economic consequences of the confrontation between NATO and Russia than they are about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine per se, and/or the staunchly pro-NATO stance taken by Meloni who undermined one of the arguments brought against her, and/or the factual evidence that the centre-right has ruled the country for many years in the 90s and the 00s without giving the impression to plan to restore Fascism. 

PD’s message proved ineffective also because it was the same message the party had sold to its (shrinking) electorate over the last quarter of a century, no matter who their main opponent was (first Berlusconi, then the Five Star Movement and Lega, now Brothers of Italy). Moreover, public statements by foreign leaders on how they would respond to the “threat” of a Meloni-led Government probably had the effect of uniting centre-right voters who don’t like foreign interference, rather than scaring anyone into voting for PD.

The campaign conducted by Five Star Movement leader, and former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was much more effective. The movement held on at least to its strongholds in large metropolitan areas in the South, thanks to its continued support for the citizenship income (a measure they passed while in Government) and their proposal for the introduction of a minimum wage. Having departed from its original profile of an anti-establishment, Eurosceptic party, the Five Star Movement has successfully turned into a populist party of the left, and possibly a partner of PD to form a new progressive alliance in the years to come.

In terms of the next steps, the new Parliament will convene on the 13th of October. As soon as the Chairs of the two Houses are elected, President Mattarella will start his talks with party leaders to appoint the new Prime Minister – presumably Giorgia Meloni. We expect the new Cabinet to be sworn in and to go to Parliament for the initial confidence vote by the end of October.

Written by
Marco Sonsini
Profile
Latest News
  • News
    Gerd Götz joins FIPRA as a Special Advisor on Green Transition
    17 March 2023
  • Analysis
    PFAS: rooting ambitions for a toxic-free environment in a manageable process
    10 March 2023
  • News
    Erwin Dhondt  joins FIPRA as a Special Advisor for Health Security
    22 February 2023
  • Analysis
    EU’s small but vital step to shipping decarbonisation: the maritime ETS 
    9 February 2023
  • Analysis
    European Parliament’s New Year Resolution: build a powerful but child-friendly online gaming industry
    19 January 2023
  • FIPRA in Australia
    FIPRA in Australia
    is known locally as Richardson Coutts
    FIPRA in Australia
  • FIPRA in Austria
    FIPRA in Austria
    is known locally as Mastermind Public Affairs Consulting
    FIPRA in Austria
  • FIPRA in Belgium
    FIPRA in Belgium
    is known locally as Greenlane Public Affair
    FIPRA in Belgium
  • FIPRA in Canada
    FIPRA in Canada
    is known locally as Earnscliffe Strategy Group
    FIPRA in Canada
  • FIPRA in China
    FIPRA in China
    is known locally as Yuan Associates
    FIPRA in China
  • FIPRA in Croatia
    FIPRA in Croatia
    is known locally as Vlahovic Group
    FIPRA in Croatia
  • FIPRA in Czech Republic
    FIPRA in Czech Republic
    is known locally as PAN Solutions
    FIPRA in Czech Republic
  • FIPRA in Denmark
    FIPRA in Denmark
    is known locally as European Advisers
  • FIPRA in Estonia
    FIPRA in Estonia
    is known locally as META Advisory Group
    FIPRA in Estonia
  • FIPRA in France
    FIPRA in France
    is known locally as Cabinet Samman
    FIPRA in France
  • FIPRA in Georgia
    FIPRA in Georgia
    is known locally as BGI Advisory Services Group
    FIPRA in Georgia
  • FIPRA in Germany
    FIPRA in Germany
    is known locally as Miller & Meier Consulting
    FIPRA in Germany
  • FIPRA in Greece
    FIPRA in Greece
    is known locally as One Team S.A
    FIPRA in Greece
  • FIPRA in Hungary
    FIPRA in Hungary
    is known locally as CEC Group
    FIPRA in Hungary
  • FIPRA in India
    FIPRA in India
    is known locally as Chase India
    FIPRA in India
  • FIPRA in Ireland
    FIPRA in Ireland
    is known locally as Vulcan Consulting
    FIPRA in Ireland
  • FIPRA in Italy
    FIPRA in Italy
    is known locally as Telos A&S
    FIPRA in Italy
  • FIPRA in Japan
    FIPRA in Japan
    is known locally as GR Japan
    FIPRA in Japan
  • FIPRA in Korea
    FIPRA in Korea
    is known locally as FIPRA Korea
  • FIPRA in Latvia
    FIPRA in Latvia
    is known locally as Meta Advisory
    FIPRA in Latvia
  • FIPRA in Luxembourg
    FIPRA in Luxembourg
    is known locally as Huggard Consulting Group
    FIPRA in Luxembourg
  • FIPRA in Malta
    FIPRA in Malta
    is known locally as Maritimus Company Limited
    FIPRA in Malta
  • FIPRA in Mexico
    FIPRA in Mexico
    is known locally as InStrag
    FIPRA in Mexico
  • FIPRA in The Netherlands
    FIPRA in The Netherlands
    is known locally as Public Matters
    FIPRA in The Netherlands
  • FIPRA in Norway
    FIPRA in Norway
    is known locally as First House
    FIPRA in Norway
  • FIPRA in Poland
    FIPRA in Poland
    is known locally as CEC Group
    FIPRA in Poland
  • FIPRA in Portugal
    FIPRA in Portugal
    is known locally as Initium
  • FIPRA in Singapore
    FIPRA in Singapore
    is known locally as Landmark Public Affairs
    FIPRA in Singapore
  • FIPRA in Slovakia
    FIPRA in Slovakia
    is known locally as FIPRA Slovakia
  • FIPRA in Slovenia
    FIPRA in Slovenia
    is known locally as MC Public Affairs S.a.r.l.
    FIPRA in Slovenia
  • FIPRA in South Africa
    FIPRA in South Africa
    is known locally as Ethicore Political Lobbying
    FIPRA in South Africa
  • FIPRA in Spain
    FIPRA in Spain
    is known locally as Influence Spain
    FIPRA in Spain
  • FIPRA in Sweden
    FIPRA in Sweden
    is known locally as Hallvarsson & Halvarsson (H&H)
    FIPRA in Sweden
  • FIPRA in Switzerland
    FIPRA in Switzerland
    is known locally as Hirzel.Neef.Schmid.Counselors
    FIPRA in Switzerland
  • FIPRA in Tunisia
    FIPRA in Tunisia
    is known locally as Mediterranean Development Initiative
    FIPRA in Tunisia
  • FIPRA in Turkey
    FIPRA in Turkey
    is known locally as Stamina Public Affairs
    FIPRA in Turkey
  • FIPRA in Turkey
    FIPRA in Turkey
    is known locally as Stamina Public Affairs
  • FIPRA in Ukraine
    FIPRA in Ukraine
    is known locally as Stober Poltavets & Associates
    FIPRA in Ukraine
  • FIPRA in the United Kingdom
    FIPRA in the United Kingdom
    is known locally as Lexington
    FIPRA in the United Kingdom
  • FIPRA in the United States
    FIPRA in the United States
    is known locally as Alpine Group
    FIPRA in the United States
FIPRA Network

FIPRA

© FIPRA 2023.
All rights reserved.

Follow us on Twitter  Find us on LinkedIn

  • Privacy Policy
Explore
  • About Us
  • Our Practice Areas
  • Our Team
  • FIPRA Network
  • Latest News
  • Events
  • Careers
  • FIPRA Tools
  • Contact Us
Practice Areas
  • Banking & Financial Services
  • Competition & Antitrust
  • Digital & Tech
  • EU & International
  • Food & Drink
  • Green Transition
  • Healthcare, Life Sciences & Wellbeing
  • Trade & Investment (including EU-UK)
  • Transport, Travel & Logistics
Contact

info@fipra.com

Brussels Office  map
FIPRA International SRL
Rue de la Loi 227
Brussels 1040
+32 (0)2 613 28 28
Company number: 0733.774.811

London Office  map
FIPRA International Limited
201 Borough High Street
London
SE1 1JA
+44 (0)203 805 7770
Company number: 3936157